The Shahed-136 is originally an Iranian drone-kamikaze, which has become a pillar of the Russian arsenal since the start of its large-scale invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022. First delivered by Iran, it is now produced in Russia under the name of Geran-2. Inexpensive, with great autonomy and a substantial explosive load, it has established itself as an essential tool for deep strikes and Russian tactical operations in Ukraine. But the Ukrainian army, faced with this threat, has developed increasingly effective methods to counter it, forcing Moscow to react, analyzes the American magazine Forbes.
Faced with the multiplication of Shahed drone attacks, Ukraine has established an anti -aircraft defense doctrine capable of quickly adapting to enemy tactics. When Russia began to launch lure drones to saturate the Ukrainian defenses, kyiv was able to react, neutralize both lures and real Shaheds, thanks to a mixture of kinetic (firearms, missiles) and non-kinetic (electronic scramble). On January 25, 2025, the Ukrainian air force, for example, announced that it had intercepted sixty-one Shahed drones: fifteen were scrambled, forty-six slaughtered, none has reached its target.
Electronic jamming allows you to neutralize about half of the low -altitude flying drones sent by the Kremlin. The equipment is regularly updated to exploit the weaknesses of Russian systems, which in turn try to adapt to Ukrainian countermeasures. For drones that pass between the mesh of the net, kyiv adapts his response according to the altitude: fighter planes intercept the devices in high altitude, while mobile teams with machine guns attack those flying lower.
In recent weeks, however, while Moscow intensifies its strikes, the situation seems to have changed. On June 25, on seventy-one Shahed drones launched, thirty-two were shot, twenty scrambles, but nineteen reached their targets. This increase is not trivial and marks a switch: Russian drones more often pierce Ukrainian defenses.
Shielding, submunitions and new tactics
Shahed’s latest models are actually more resistant. Their engine compartment is armored to withstand machine gun fire and fuel tanks, previously located in the wings, have been moved to the body of the drone. Result: it has become much more difficult to shoot a Shahed with a simple shot. Certain versions even embark on submunitions, which they drop in flight before going to crash on their targets, widening the impact zone and making the drone more effective against troop concentrations or fortified positions.
The Russian army is no longer content to launch isolated drones. She now sends them in pairs, a low steering wheel to hide the other, higher, to Ukrainian radars. The drone located at altitude thus benefits from the radar saturated by the first, which leaves him more time to reach his target. Another innovation: Shahed are now accompanied by Lancet drones, smaller and more difficult to detect, which track down the Ukrainian teams responsible for interception. By neutralizing these teams, Lancet pave the way to the Shahed, who can then strike without hindrance.
Faced with these developments, Ukraine must constantly reinvent its defense strategy. Ukrainian engineers work to improve detection systems to counter the tactics of drone duets and ground teams strengthen the protection of their vehicles by equipping themselves with more powerful rifles to inflict more damage to drones. kyiv also struck a Shahed production plant, to slow down the flow of these kamikazes at the source.
Since the start of the Russian invasion, this war has been a permanent race for technological and tactical innovation. Russia improves its drones, Ukraine adapts its defenses and the cycle starts again… for how long?
