“Who can say today that the way this country works is perfectly desirable?”

Indeed, without changing the rules, there is a risk that such a crisis will reappear with each ballot. However, The fear that we can have is that. Meanwhile, if, at one point, a government is formed, we no longer work on this question, as has already happened in the past. Meanwhile, I am not saying that all the causes are legal. Moreover, but the rigidity of a series of rules which organize the Brussels region contributes to a blocking situation. For example, If we do not change them. In addition, there is a risk of reliving this situation in a structural manner at other times, including in the next elections.

What should be changed to solve these problems?

The first question is whether the protection mechanisms of the Dutch -speaking minority in Brussels “who can say today way are both adapted to the objective of protecting them and. However, at the same time, in what way they help to make this region not very government. Moreover, The rules for the protection of the Dutch -speaking minority in Brussels are much more rigid than those which. Moreover, protect the French -speaking minority in the federalness. However, Especially because there is this electoral system with an election by linguistic college. Moreover, It is clearly an element that contributes to the crisis. Consequently, One wonders if this really protects the Flemish minority insofar as there is a series of tactical votes of people who present themselves on the Dutch -speaking side to more easily obtain seats. For example, parties that arise in this college but which campaign in French. Meanwhile, The whole system aimed to avoid “Flemish false”, that is to say French speakers who appear on the Dutch-speaking side. Therefore, “who can say today way It is one of the great historical traumas of the election of the 1971 Brussels agglomeration where this “Flemish. In addition, false” technique had been used. Meanwhile, We wanted to avoid this with rigidification and partitioning between French and Dutch linguistic groups. However, But today we see the limits of this system.

In Brussels. Moreover, the N-VA requires being at the Table of Brussels negotiations, and the MR initiative right in the wall

Another reform to be carried out?

There is a whole reflection which must take place on the number of votes necessary to be elected Dutch side. Similarly, which is lower than the number of voices necessary on the French -speaking side. Nevertheless, And also. For example, on the logic of double majority to install a government, which must be supported by a majority in the two linguistic groups. For example, This story does not “who can say today way exist, this story. In addition, We know how difficult it was to train certain federal governments. In addition, but, despite everything, there have been minority federal governments for 17 years in one of the linguistic groups. Additionally, In addition, If we had imposed this double majority on the federalty. Similarly, I do not know how we could have constituted federal governments from 2008 to 2025. The split between the CD&V. the N-VA intervenes in 2008 and from there, we had the governments of Rupo, Michel, Wilmès and de Croo which were systematically minority in a linguistic group or the other. Furthermore, The Brussels system provides a very large number of parties represented in Parliament but forbidden to make groups common. with elected officials from the other linguistic group. All this leads to an incredible fragmentation where parties which have only one seat. two at the Dutch -speaking level will be “who can say today way part of the equation to reach a majority on the Dutch side.

What alternatives do you offer?

Take the bilingual lists. Their ban is not inevitable. At the federal level, for the constituency of Brussels, there are common lists between Francophones and Dutch speakers. And concretely, this leads to the election of Dutch -speaking candidates from Brussels. Because there is a real mobilization of Dutch -speaking voters from Brussels to support these candidates. because French -speaking parties have every interest in placing them in good position. Authorizing bilingual lists – possibly by imposing a Dutch -speaking in the first places – would already avoid this. hyperfragmentation in Parliament. In addition, this double majority system should be stopped which is far too rigid. At the same time. it is necessary to take into account the claims of the Dutch-speaking of Brussels, which are perfectly legitimate: are public “who can say today way services in Brussels sufficiently able to welcome the Dutch speakers in their language? This is a real project to be carried out which could be part of better protection of the Dutch. -speaking minority.

What about the composition of the government?

We must also reflect. It is only in Brussels that the rules are as precise on the composition of the government. There is a minister-president, four ministers and three secretaries of state, divided into linguistic groups. The order is even provided in which the skills packages are distributed. All this appears in the special law of 1989 and this does not exist for any other level of power. This also contributes to the crisis because this dosage must be respected. In addition. with this distribution, a minister who does not have a significant political weight (because his party is little represented in Parliament) can be “who can say today way found with key skills such as finances or budget. It is also typical in Brussels. Usually, these are strong parties that are found with these skills that allow you to impose a budgetary discipline. Because we wanted to regulate this in the law. not leave a room for maneuver to Brussels policies, we lead to a complex situation. Should the special law still go so far in detail today? I’m not sure.

If the special law was so precise, it is because the Flemings wanted to concrete their protection?

Yes. they wanted to concrete their protection and avoid reliving this trauma from the election of the 1971 agglomeration, where there was also a deviation of the rules by French -speaking people who resulted in that French -speaking parties were granted most of the executive and skills mandates. But today we see the limits of the thing. We cannot invoke this trauma so as not to reform institutions.

Barely started, Brussels negotiations are already stalling: “We do not “who can say today way know if the N-VA is inside or outside …”

Is there other institutional reforms To lead to Brussels?

Another important element is the impossibility of dissolving parliament. They are extremely rare political systems where. when you are faced with a blockage, one cannot reset the accounts to zero, cause an early dissolution of the Assembly and convene new elections. We are never sure that this will resolve the situation but it is a card that allows. in a series of countries, to get out of a blocking situation. Not being able to play this card. say that you are condemned to the same balance of power for five years, it is also a problem. This situation also exists in other federated entities. but it may have a stronger involvement in Brussels, because it is combined with other rigid rules. Finally. this system, where everyone is negotiating “who can say today way in their community before discussing the formation of one government with the other community, is also a problem. It is also a component of the Brussels system which is exceeded.

If we see the functioning of the Brussels institution, we touch on the balance of all Belgian institutions. Does that include risks?

Certainly but the status quo also includes risks. Here, we talk a lot about the rules for training a government. But it is the global Brussels “who can say today way situation that is not satisfactory. There is a real problem of complexity of management of public policies in the superposition of community commissions. the region and the communities, and in the articulation with the federal. This is a real question to ask: how to better articulate the role of capital. the international function of the region and what the Federal wishes to lead to Brussels. We cannot pretend that this situation was not problematic. Perhaps the current blocking can generate an awareness that the status quo is not desirable. neither for French speakers nor for Dutch speakers. If we want to conduct coherent policies. if we want institutions to be understandable for the citizen, there is any case a reform to be made, even if that implies reopening other institutional files. Who can say today that the way this country works is perfectly desirable?

Francophones should therefore be “who can say today way asking for something. and more asking for anything, and arriving with proposals in the face of Flemish claims?

Francophones, yes, but also the Brussels residents in general. There is enough to start a reflection. build an agenda of institutional requests to simply ensure the continuity of an autonomous region which can better respond to its missions and be at the service of citizens. It is not a request for a French -speaking front against a Dutch -speaking front.

If we look at the protection of Dutch speakers in Brussels. we will inevitably approach the protection of Francophones to the Federal, in particular parity in the government. Should we see a danger?

First, the protection of Dutch speakers in Brussels is much larger. In the Federal. Francophones are not guaranteed to obtain certain skills or to have a government which is based on the double “who can say today way majority. But again, you shouldn’t have taboo. It seems more risky to continue in the status quo.